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1 Introduction
The re-emergence of interest in the determinants of growth has focused at-
tention on the puzzle of the apparent non-convergence of per-capita income
between low and high-income countries. One response to this dilemma has
been what has come to be known as ‘endogenous growth’ theory: which
in various forms drops the assumptions of the exogeneity of technological
change, and the homogeneity of investment opportunities across countries
(see Romer 1986, 1990 and Lucas 1988 as seminal examples). The conver-
gence prediction in Solow-Swan type growth models is of course conditional
on homogeneity of the savings rate, the labour force growth rate, and the
technology of production. Once the possibility of heterogeneity of countries
in the relatively limited dimensions provided by Solow-Swan type growth
models is recognised, the possibility that heterogeneity in other dimensions
may be of signi…cance to growth follows readily. Thus, to name a few, di¤er-
ences in the level of human capital (Barro 1991, Mankiw, Romer and Weil
1992), the depth of …nancial development (King and Levine 1993), the na-
ture and quality of government intervention in economic processes (Barro
1990, Fischer 1991, King and Levine 1993), have all been controlled for in
growth equations. Yet even after correcting for a wide variety of additional
explanatory variables, many growth equations struggle to account for cross-
country variation in growth, particularly in Africa and Latin America (see
for example Barro 1991, and Easterly and Levine 1997).
Easterly and Levine (1997: 1205), in an in‡uential article, drew attention
to the potentially important role of ethnic diversity in in‡uencing economic
growth: “cross-country di¤erences in ethnic diversity explain a substantial
part of the cross country di¤erences in public policies, political instability,
and other factors associated with long-run growth.” They …nd that eth-
nic diversity is an important predictor of economic performance, and of the
African growth experience. Central to Easterly and Levine’s perspective is
the question of whether the level of ethnic fractionalization bears on the po-
tential for distributional con‡ict. Speci…cally, they hypothesize that, in the
lightof asigni…cant body of recentliterature, polarized societies will be prone
to competitive rent-seeking that impedes agreement about the provision of
public goods 1 and that creates positive incentives for growth-reducing poli-
1This does of course beg the question why rent-seeking mobilization should be along
ethnic lines, rather than other forms of social distinction. In the current context we note
only the obvious point that rent seeking does not exclusively take ethnic form, and also thatUsing Fractionalization Indexes: 2
cies. This is attributed either to the pursuit of redistributive policies de…ned
along ethnic lines,2 or to the fact that ethnically diverse societies are more
prone to war and unrest which in turn is bad for economic growth.3
A limitation of all these studies on fractionalization is that whilst they
emphasize cross-country evidence, they do not provide a basis for exploring
the dynamics of the process. That is, they do not provide a basis on which
to establish how growth interacts with ethnolinguistic diversity. There are
at least two dimensions to this question. The …rst is that in evidence such
as that presented by Easterly and Levine (1997), what is not explicit is that
African economic growth fell dramatically from the 1960’s to 1970’s, and has
remaineddismal subsequently - at least for most of the continent. This leaves
one with the puzzle of how it is that a variable, which remains a constant
for all countries (the ethnolinguistic measure employed in many studies is for
the single year 1960), is to account for a series of growth rates that follow
the shape of a step function - with the step occurring some considerable
there exists an extensive literature exploring why ethnic mobilization is easier than some
others. Argument goes toward lower information and transaction costs, lower monitoring
costs, and lower enforcement costs in ethnic groupings. See for instance Collier’s (2001)
discussion of Posner (1980).
2Easterly and Levine (1997) and Easterly (2001) cite a vein of literature in support of
this view. Thus Mauro (1995) and La Porta et al. (1999) …nd that ethnic diversity predicts
poor quality of government services. Rodrik (1999) notes that ethnically divided nations
react more adversely to external terms of trade shocks. Svensson (2000) reports that more
foreign aid proceeds are diverted intocorruption in more ethnically diverse contexts. Knack
and Keefer (1997) …nd that ethnic homogeneity raises social capital which is associated
with higher growth and productivity. Annet (2001) claims that linguistic or religious
diversity leads to greater political instability which in turn leads to higher government
consumption. Lastly, Collier (2001: 141) mentions the Kenyan case where during the time
of President Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, the main Kikuyu city grew very rapidly at the expense
of other non-Kikuyu cities. When President Moi took over, a Kalenjin, he responded by
building a new international airport in the heartland of his own minor tribe, and …lled
certain parts of the civil service with Kalenjin. Evidence for rent seeking along ethnic
lines in South Africa is legion. For evidence demonstrating that the historic pattern is
replicating itself, see Luiz (2003).
3There appear to be two alternative explanations regarding the ethnic roots of insta-
bility. The …rst is primordial, arguing that di¤erent group identities in‡uence the way in
which people relate and interact with each other -leaving mute the question of whether
its root cause could be biological, psychological, historical, mythical or constructed. The
alternate view suggests that ethnicity is not the real issue: con‡ict may come to be ethni-
cally patterned, but not ethnically caused. Rather, ethnicity comes to be exploited, often
for reasons of political expediency, rendering ethnicity a vehicle rather than a cause of
con‡ict (see the discussion in Collier, 2001: 151).Using Fractionalization Indexes: 3
time after the point of measurement of the ethnolinguistic measure generally
employed in these studies.
The second dimension to the question addresses whether or not it is le-
gitimate to view ethnolinguistic fractionalization as a constant over time.
Is it instead not at least feasible that ethnolinguistic diversity changes with
growth? If so, in what direction? And why might such a change occur? To
answer these kinds of questions, a time series based study is needed.
South Africa constitutes an interesting case in which to explore the pur-
chase of the claim concerning the (negative) impact of ethnolinguistic frac-
tionalization on growth. In terms of the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization
Index (ETHNIC) cited by Easterly and Levine, South Africa in 1960 ranked
6th out of 66 countries covered by this index with a value on the measure
of 88 (that is a probability of 88% that two randomly chosen individuals are
of di¤erent ethno-linguistic origin). The most highly fractionalized country
was Tanzania (score of 93) and the least fractionalized were Haiti, Japan
and Portugal (score of 1). South African census data collected since 1910
provides historical evidence of this fractionalization. Important, too, in the
South African case is that from 1948 through to the demise of Apartheid, a
major attempt was made to socially and politically “engineer” South Africa
along the lines of supposedly “essentialist” ethnic identities. At least with
regard to the “African” community these ethnic divisions were meant to co-
incide with linguistic identities. That South Africa continues to be linguisti-
cally highly fractionalized is registered, at least in part, by the fact that the
present (post 1994) Constitution acknowledges linguistic diversity through
the legal recognition of eleven o¢cial languages. If fractionalization is an
important explanatory variable in the long run growth process of a country,
South Africa is ideal to test this hypothesis. That data also proves to be
available for this case study renders it doubly interesting, since it becomes
susceptible to rigorous analysis. This is reinforced by the fact that a number
of studies have already demonstrated that the social, political and institu-
tional variables (SPIVs) available for South Africa prove to be important in
driving the long run economic performance of the economy.4
4On the impact of political instability on investment, see Fielding (2000), and Fedderke
(2004). On the impact of political instability, and changes in political rights on short and
long term capital ‡ows as well as capital ‡ight, see Fedderke and Liu (2001). On the
impact of political instability on human capital production in black schooling in South
Africa, see Fedderke and Luiz (2002). On the interaction of political instability, political
rights and economic growth in South Africa see Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001b).Using Fractionalization Indexes: 4
This paper introduces, describes and analyzes three new sets of societal
indicators and one set of political indicators for South Africa from 1910 to
1997. The societal indicators are, respectively, linguistic, religious and racial
fractionalization.5 The political indicator measures political fractionalization
as measured by the distribution of members of the legislature across political
parties (developed in Fedderke et al, 2001a). The choice of these indicators
was occasioned by the desire to establish whether, and if so in what degree,
social and political diversity might help explain the long-run growth per-
formance of the South African economy.6 What is unique to the study is
the use of time series data over an extended time frame in a wide range of
institutional dimensions.
Section 2 of the paper notes a range of measurement issues relevant to
the institutional variables employed in the study. Section 3 examines the
signi…cance of dynamics in measures of fractionalization. Section 4 explores
thequestion of whether thelevel ofaggregation inthefractionalization carries
analytical signi…cance. Section 5 further examines the magnitude of impact
of measurement error. Section 6 concludes.
2 Fractionalization: re‡ecting on the signi…cance of
measurement problems
Measures of ethnolingusitic fractionalization have come to be widely used in
growth studies. In addition, the literature has seen the introduction of at
least two measures of such fractionalization.7 Since the present study intro-
duces a range of new measures of fractionalization, in a number of dimen-
sions, we re‡ect brie‡y on some issues surrounding both the measurement
and interpretation of linguistic and ethnic fractionalization.
The fractionalization indexes employed for the present study were con-
5A fractionalization index measures the probability that any two randomly selected
members of a statistical population will possess di¤erent properties in the dimension that
is being measured.
6This study is part of a larger project that has been concerned to address the institu-
tional dimensions of long-term economic growth in South Africa. See Fedderke et al (1999,
2000, 2001a, 2001 b, 2002, 2003).
7The …rst, and most widely used in growth studies is the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964)
measure, developed by Russian ethnological scholars. The second and more recent measure
we are aware of, is the Alesina et al (2002) measure. Furthermore, Posner (2004) has
developed a new fractionalization index but only for Africa.Using Fractionalization Indexes: 5
structed by consulting o¢cial South African government statistical sources
which are based on census data. Between 1910 and 1960 our principal source
has been the Union Statistics for 50 Years and various other o¢cial statistical
yearbooks. Subsequently the Central Statistical Services Reports were our
primary sources as well as various statistical reports of the apartheid-created
‘independent homelands’.
We beginourdiscussionoffractionalizationwitha general methodological
warning that applies repeatedly in what follows. Obtaining consistent and
reliable data series on linguistic usage and other forms of fractionalization in
South Africa was non-trivial. The scope and accuracy of coverage of di¤er-
ent population groups has not been consistent over time. Particularly with
respect to Africans, early years showed incomplete data collection, rendering
data unreliable. Moreover, under Apartheid and the repeated creation, rede-
…nition, and disappearance of supposedly ethnically de…ned “Homelands,”8
signi…cant portions of the African population disappeared, moved classi…ca-
tion, and reappeared in statistical sources. Finding, reclassifying, reinserting
such populations was not a trivial task. The implication is that the frac-
tionalization data su¤ers substantially from data collection problems. After
1970 the active creation of Homelands for Africans under Apartheid poli-
cies shifted responsibility for census data collection away from Pretoria. For
example, data collection on …rst language orientation by Homelands was neg-
ligible. The consequence is anerror of measurement in any use ofo¢cial data
series, with a downward bias in the resulting linguistic fractionalization. Re-
ported fractionalization indices in the present studies are corrected for any
Homeland exclusion.
The general point here is that given the demands of this undertaking even
for a country such as South Africa, which relative to many other developing
countries has fairly extensive and sounddatacollectionprocedures, thisraises
signi…cant questions concerning the quality of data for developing countries
in general - where data collectionfrequently is even more problematic than in
South Africa, in the presence of high levels of fractionalization which require
high levels of accuracy.
For example, the highest levels of linguistic fractionalization reported
in Alesina et al (2002) are for the Cameroon, Chad, the CAR, the DRC,
8Under Apartheid attempts were made to create “independent” political entities de…ned
ethnically, o¢cially referred to as “homelands.” Only a small number of the projected
homelands pursued the goal of independence to any extent.Using Fractionalization Indexes: 6
Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea-Bisau, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia - all of
which report a probability value of above 0.8. The countries with the highest
levels of fractionalization are those most likely to have the most contentious
data being employed in cross sectional growth studies. Furthermore, the
data employed by Alesina et al for a wide range of countries rely on the
Encyclopedia Britannica, the CIA World Factbook, Scarrit and Moza¤ar
(1999), Levinson(1998)andthe WorldDirectory ofMinoritiesoftheMinority
Rights Group International (1997). The South African data comes out of the
Levinson work and di¤ers from that calculated in this paper from primary
data. A cursory glance through these sources reveal some of the problems.
For example, theCIA Factbook lists SouthAfricanethnic groups onthe basis
of the four racial population groups. While racial fractionalization in South
Africa is undoubtedly important (and we deal with it in a separate section
below), ethnic divisions cleave racial groupings also. This is well illustrated
by the high degree of fractionalization within the African population group
in South Africa, where linguistic grouping does correlate to some extent with
ethnic identity. The CIA Factbook also lists the religious groups as follows:
Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Indigenous with no further di¤erentiation,
whereas for South Africa more detailed data is available. Note further that
for other countries in the Alesina et al data set these categories are further
disaggregated. An immediate question must therefore be whether like is
being compared with like in international cross-country estimations.
In similar vein, Posner (2004) criticizes the ethnolinguistic fractional-
ization index used in growth studies based upon the Atlas Naradov Mira
measures. He highlights the ‘grouping problem’ in which umbrella categories
sometimes subsume groups that are clearly distinct and often highly antago-
nistic. He cites the Tanzanian example in which the Nyamwezi and Sukumo
are collapsedinto a single category despite the fact that these groups are very
distinct (culturally, linguistically and geographically) and are keen political
competitors. In fact both the Rwanda and the Burundi measures collapse
the Hutus and Tutsis into a monolithic category which ignores a fundamen-
tal cleavage which played a role in the devastation faced by both countries
towards the end of the twentieth century. On other occasions he points to
the‘problem of inclusion’ where distinct linguistic groups areproducedinthe
Atlas study but which are irrelevant as political actors. Posner does not deny
the importance of ethnic groups in the Atlas but rather claims that they are
unimportant for the political measure that ethnolinguistic fractionalizationUsing Fractionalization Indexes: 7
is trying to test namely the competition for power and resources.
Posner (2004) furthermore takes issue with the use of Her…ndahl indexes
more generally and questions whether they are the best means of capturing a
country’s diversity because it often is insensitive to a great deal of variation
in the ethnic landscapes being compared. Two countries can both have a
Her…ndahl measure of 0.5 but with vastly di¤erent ethnic landscapes. One
can have two groups of equal size whilst the second contains three groups
containing two-thirds, one-sixth and one-sixth of the population respectively.
The dynamic of inter-group competition would be very di¤erent but would
not be captured by the formula. A further problem he highlights is that
the index contains no information about the depth of the divisions between
di¤erent groups. It also provides no information about the relative political
weights to be assigned to various ethnic groups. So for example, the white
proportion in South Africa does not capture the impact of this group on the
country’s political landscape. The …nal problem presented by Posner is that
these single measures contain multiple ethnic and political cleavages which
change over time. He cites the Indian example of a population which is
divided along ethnic, religious, linguistic and caste lines and questions which
group division is more relevant.
While issues of measurement are undoubtedly crucial, these extend be-
yond simple questions of accuracy of measurement. In the sections that
follow in this paper we consider a range of additional questions that arise
in the context of appropriate construction, and interpretation of measures
of fractionalization. The intention of the discussion is to move beyond the
consideration of static measures with wide geographic sweep. Instead, the
object of the discussion is to consider questions that arise from the introduc-
tion of time, and questions of aggregation that arise from in-depth evidence
to emerge from a speci…c case study.
3 Dynamics: do changes over time exist in measures
of fractionalization, and do they carry analytical sig-
ni…cance?
Dataquestionssurroundingfractionalizationextendbeyondproblems ofmea-
surement. An equally important set of considerations, to be explored over
the course of the following sections, concern appropriate interpretationof the
evidence that emerges from the data.Using Fractionalization Indexes: 8
The …rst question arises due to the fact that studies employing measures
of fractionalization, frequently do so on the basis of data that have an ob-
servation at a single time point (Atlas Naradov Mira, Alesina 2002). These
observations bear a considerable analytical burden - as explanatory variables
of dynamic processes in economic development, generally per capita GDP.
Data sets have observations for distinct years across countries (the measure
is not for the same year across countries). Implicit in the use of either set
of fractionalization measures, is the presumption that measures of fraction-
alization are essentially static, and exogenous to processes of economic de-
velopment. Only on this presumption would the time point of measurement
and/or the time-invariant nature of the fractionalization measure be irrele-
vant to estimation of the fractionalization impact. The immediate question
is then whether the presumption of an unchanging magnitude of the frac-
tionalization measures employed in studies is justi…ed.
Evidence from South Africa on …rst blush suggests that it may be. In
Table 1 we report fractionalization measures on linguistic and religious frac-
tionalization for the aggregate SouthAfrican population, for available census
years in South Africa.9 The presumption that measures of fractionalization
appear to be relatively invariant over time, appears to be vindicated, with
both linguistic and religious fractionalization changing by relatively little in
aggregate for South Africa over a period of more than half a century.
However, the same cannot be said of the measure of racial fractionaliza-
tion also reported in Table 1. While the measure remained fairly constant
over the 1911-1960 period (at a probability of approximately 0.49), from
1960-2001 fractionalization declined substantially in relative terms to end
with a probability of 0.36 in 2001.
The distinction between the three measures of fractionalization is partic-










where ni denotes the number of members of households that cite the i’th language as
the principal medium of communication within the household, N denotes the number of
members in the population. F thus computes the probability that two randomly chosen
individuals speak di¤erent …rst languages. Symmetrically for religious fractionalization.
Note that for linguistic fractionalization we suppressed the 1936 observation, and for re-
ligious fractionalization the 1921 observation. While available, data collection problems
resulted in clear outlier observations relative to the rest of the series.Using Fractionalization Indexes: 9
ularly important when placed into the context of the level of distributional
con‡ict in South Africa. A number of studies have examined the impact
of distributional con‡ict on growth in South Africa, including its impact on
investment in physical capital stock. Results are unanimous in con…rming a
negative impact of a measure of political instability on either output directly,
or on investment rates.10Yet, the measure is not readily tied to our measures
of fractionalization in any manner that readily conforms to the priors that
arise from the literature on fractionalization. In Figure 1 we depict the mea-
sure of political instability (as proxy for distributional con‡ict),11 as well as
the measures of fractionalization.
The measure of distributional con‡ict in South Africa identi…es a number
of periods of intense con‡ict - during the 1960s, the 1970s, and particularly
the 1980s. This much is conventional wisdom about South Africa. But note
that the aggregate linguistic fractionalization measure for South Africa re-
mains virtually unchanged, both over periods of stability (1946-1964; the
1990’s) as well as periods of relative instability. Similarly, the measure of
religious fractionalization shows its period of increase before the periods of
intense con‡ict, and remains virtually static over the period of intense con-
‡ict. 12
10See Fielding (2000), Fedderke (2004), Mariotti (2002), Kularatne (2002), Fedderke
and Luiz (2005a).
11The measure of political instability is obtained from Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz
(2001a). One objection might query whether the measure of political instability is in-
deed a measure of distributional con‡ict. Instead political con‡ict in South Africa may
be conceived of as a con‡ict not over access to resources but over political rights. How-
ever, Fedderke and Luiz (2005a) demonstrate that the primitive here is property rights,
which in‡uence both growth and political con‡ict, while political rights are an outcome
variable from the interaction of economic and property rights developments. E¤ectively
the exclusion of most racial groupings in South Africa from access to resources by denying
them relevant property rights renders questionable the suggestion that con‡ict was, at
least exclusively, concerned with political rights, and not with rights over resources.
12We recognize that this might lead to the conjecture that rising religious fractionaliza-
tion might have led to distributional con‡ict - though with a lag. Two reasons suggest
that this is unlikely. Barro and McCleary (2003) …nd that religious beliefs do in‡uence
economic performance and certainly this association goes back to the seminal work of Max
Weber. The decision to measure religious diversity was in part occasioned by the fact that
South Africa has historically been characterized by a considerable diversity of religions.
It should be noted that, notwithstanding this diversity of religions, the country does not
have a history of signi…cant con‡ict between religious communities. Instead religious com-
munities and institutions have been mobilized around political issues, notably with respect
either to supporting or criticizing Apartheid. In this regard, many religious organizationsUsing Fractionalization Indexes: 10
Instead, the most likely source of distributional con‡ict, if such a source is
to be found in a fractionalization measure, comes from the measure of racial
fractionalization. This is the only fractionalization measure that demon-
strates signi…cant change from the period preceding signi…cant distributional
con‡ict, to the period in which distributional con‡ict rose dramatically.
That distributional con‡ict in South Africa might most plausibly be
linked to racial divisions in the society does not seem a dramatic …nding
to have reached. After all, what could possibly constitute a more clichéd
view of the South African political landscape? Indeed, it is precisely the
racial fractionalization measure that Alesina et al (2002) employs for South
Africa.
But there are at least four considerations in relation to the empirical ev-
idence that nuance the …ndings from cliché to insight. First, note that in
contrast to the measure employed by Alesina for fractionalization in South
Africa, the measure of fractionalization most plausibly related to distribu-
tional con‡ict is not static, but strongly changes over the sample time frame.
Indeed, it is this very change in the fractionalization measure that usefully
might be said to distinguish between periods of relative stability and insta-
bility in South Africa.
Second, note that the direction of change in the racial fractionalization
variable is the opposite to that predicted by the literature. It is not rising,
but falling racial fractionalization that appears to be associated with rising
political instability, though by the 1990s political instability quietens again
despite a continued decline in racial fractionalization which continues to this
day. One responseto this…nding is toconjecture that the associationbetween
fractionalization and distributional con‡ict is more non-linear than generally
hypothesized in the literature. Very high fractionalization measures may
re‡ect iso-sized groups, in stable equilibrium rather than in distributional
struggle. The relative strength of each grouping may be such as to render
the cost of con‡ict prohibitive to each. Instead, it is precisely the disturbance
of such an equilibrium through increased pressure toward homogenization,
brought about by a relative gain in one or another of societies constituent
came into con‡ict with the government. Some supported the Apartheid project and some
were internally divided over the issue. The important point, however, is that these di-
visions were not primarily divisions between religious movements on speci…cally religious
matters. They were divisions on the matter of the morality of Apartheid. See for instance
the discussions in Research Institute for Theology and Religion (2000). We re‡ect further
on questions of causality below.Using Fractionalization Indexes: 11
groups, that may trigger distributional con‡ict - either through aggression
(such as increased repression of a growing disadvantaged group), or as a
defensive measure (such as rising political resistance in the face of legislative
measures designed to disempower). Eventually, the relative preponderance
of one group may become su¢ciently large to once again render the cost of
con‡ict prohibitive for other groups, such that su¢ciently high homogeneity
in turn leads once again to political accommodation and relative stability.13
A third consideration might concern the direction of causality between
instability and the fractionalization measure. Racial fractionalization might
well have fallen at least in part due to white emigration, in the face of rising
oppositionto themaintenance of white privilege. Underthis interpretationof
the evidence causality would run from instability to racial fractionalization,
rather than vice versa. A further consideration here might be to question
again the interpretation of the interaction between religious fractionalization
and political instability - of whether rising religious fractionalization might
have led to distributional con‡ict - though with a lag.
To investigate these questions we examine the interaction between the
three measures of fractionalization and political instability, employing the
bounds analysis of Pesaran, Shinand Smith(2001).14 Wereport the resultant
13In South Africa, this resulted …rstly in the Tricameral parliament of 1983 (which
co-opted Coloureds and Asians into the formal legislative structures in the hopes of
building new alliances and building critical mass) and then in 1989 in the unbanning
of the African resistance movements (including the African National Congress and the
Pan African Congress). The unbanning of these anti-apartheid movements in turn paved
the way for the constitutional negotiations which led to democratic elections in 1994.
14See also the discussion in Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1995a, 1995b) and
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). Suppose that the question is whether there exists a
long run relationship between the set of variables yt,x1;t;:::xn;t: Univariate time series
characteristics of the data are not known for certain. The PSS approach to testing for the






















The test proceeds by computing the standard F-statistic for the joint signi…cance of
±1 = ±2 = ::: = ±n+1 = 0; under all feasible alternative LHS variables. While the
distribution of the test statistic is non-standard, with xi;t » I(0)8i providing a lowerUsing Fractionalization Indexes: 12
F-tests in Table 2.
The evidence is instructive. The causality tests unambiguously favor the
direction of association to be from racial fractionalization to political in-
stability, with no evidence in favor of the reverse direction of association.15
Second, there is no evidence of religious fractionalization impacting on polit-
ical instability - nor of religious fractionalization being in‡uenced either by
any other measure of social cleavage or by the political instability measure.
Third, it is noteworthy that the di¤erent measures of fractionalizationappear
to hang together - with particularly linguistic fractionalization appearing as
outcome variable ‡owing from other forms of social cleavage.
The fourth and …nal implication that follows from the evidence is that
the trigger for distributional con‡ict in a society is at least not universally
associated with a single measure of social cleavage. In South Africa linguistic
fractionalization, at least at the aggregate level is di¢cult to associate with
variations inpolitical instability - whileracial fractionalizationis morereadily
so associated.
The general point thus is that while there may well be links between
distributional con‡ict and measures of fractionalization, such links may prove
to be contingent on history and social context. Appropriate measures of
fractionalization to be associated with distributional con‡ict may thus be
heterogeneous across societies.16
bound value,xi;t » I(1)8i an upper bound value to the test statistic. The test is analogous
to a Granger causality test, but in the presence of non-stationary data. This renders the
PSS F-test suitable in the current context.
15This direction of association is further favoured by the fact that emigration from
South Africa accelerated during the 1980s and 1990s, considerably after the process of
racial homogenization of the population began.
16A cursory examination of the international political landscape readily demonstrates
that it is unlikely that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is necessarily the de…ning social
fault line. Whilst ethnolinguistic fractionalization may be the social cleavage which re-
sulted in con‡ict in Rwanda and Burundi, it is not clear that this is the case in other
con‡icts. The long lasting con‡ict in Northern Ireland was ostensibly waged between
Protestants and Catholics and was thus driven by a religious cleavage. The balkanization
of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had many dimensions including ethnolinguistic and
religious cleavages. The Huntington (1997) hypothesis of the clash of civilizations supports
a number of fundamental cleavages in world politics and these could easily be translated
intra-country, although not his intention. The current con‡ict in the Sudan likewise reveals
a complex network of cleavages including religious and racial. It is simplistic therefore to
assume that the default cleavage for distributional con‡ict will necessarily be ethnolinguis-
tic rather than other forms of social and political cleavages including the most obvious ofUsing Fractionalization Indexes: 13
4 Is Distributional Con‡ict a Problem Emergent at
the Aggregate Level?
Thus far we have considered dataonly at theaggregatelevel for South Africa.
Both the linguistic and the religious fractionalization measures ignored any
information to emerge at more disaggregated levels - for racial groups, for
instance.
Yet given the evidence to have just emerged on the impact of racial frac-
tionalization on political instability, it is not clear that aggregate measures
of fractionalization are appropriate for capturing distributional con‡ict, at
least in South Africa. Instead, distributional con‡ict may be the expression
of developments that are located at greater levels of disaggregation than can
be captured by the simple summary measures reported thus far.
In order to examine the plausibility of this hypothesis we measure linguis-
tic fractionalization, disaggregated so as to capture not only the overall level
of fractionalization, but also the levels of fractionalization within the racial
groups as they were o¢cially designated in the period of segregation prior
to 1948, and which became statutorily encoded after 1948 under Apartheid.
In this way we are better able to capture dynamic processes and potentially
interesting patterns of change that might not be observedif one were to focus
only on the aggregate data.
In order to examine the plausibility of this hypothesis we measure linguis-
tic fractionalization, disaggregated so as to capture not only the overall level
of fractionalization, but also the levels of fractionalization within the racial
groups as they were o¢cially designated in the period of segregation prior to
1948, and which became statutorily encoded after 1948 under Apartheid.17
In this way we are better able to capture dynamic processes and potentially
interesting patterns of change that might not be observedif one were to focus
only on the aggregate data. See Table 3 below.
We have already notedthat the aggregate measures of both linguistic and
religious fractionalization in South Africa remain constant over protracted
periods of time. By contrast, the disaggregated fractionalization indexes in
both dimensions, when decomposed by race, show substantial variation over
time. In e¤ect, the aggregate evidence on linguistic and religious fractional-
race and religion.
17The study employs the Apartheid racial classi…catory system of African, Asian,
Coloured and White, given the prevalence of data collection under these categories.Using Fractionalization Indexes: 14
ization in South Africa is misleading in the sense that it fails to re‡ect the
substantial extent of social change that occurs within the society.
A number of features stand out from the evidence:
² Only two out of eight racially decomposed measures of linguistic and
religious fractionalization show stability of the same order as the ag-
gregate measures: African linguistic fractionalization and Coloured re-
ligious fractionalization. All other racially disaggregated measures in
either dimension report relatively strong change over time.
² Ofthe four racial groupings in SouthAfrica, thetwosmallest groupings,
that of Coloureds and Asians, show the most dramatic change over
time. Most spectacular of all, Asian linguistic fractionalization falls
from a probability measure of 0.78 in 1970, to 0.10 in 1991, re‡ecting a
switch from a range of Indian …rst languages to English over the twenty
year period. While linguistic fractionalization amongst Coloureds has
risen rather than fallen strongly from 0.21 to 0.29 over the same period,
it also has done so by virtue of a linguistic switch to English …rst
language, from Afrikaans in this instance. Over the period in which
Asian linguistic fractionalization is falling dramatically, Asian religious
fractionalization is increasing strongly, from 0.47 to 0.61.
² One of the two “dominant” racial groups of South Africa also shows in-
stances in which a stable pattern of fractionalization is disturbed. Here
however, the disturbance is relatively temporary, with a reversion to
the former stable fractionalization pattern reemerging over time. Thus
white linguistic fractionalization rises from 1970 -1980, with the entry
of signi…cant Portuguese immigration from the two former Portuguese
colonies of Mozambique and Angola. However, the increase in frac-
tionalization rapidly reverted to the former level of fractionalization by
1991, as the Portuguese immigrants were assimilated into the Anglo-
phone white linguistic grouping.
Two general implications are suggested by this evidence.
The …rst is that aggregate measures of fractionalization may prove to be
substantively misleading as indicators of underlying potential for distribu-
tional con‡ict. In South Africa, the aggregate measure of linguistic fraction-
alization simply hides substantial movement in the extent of cleavage thatUsing Fractionalization Indexes: 15
emerges at more disaggregatedlevels, and which might conceivably have trig-
gered distributional con‡ict. Linguistic fractionalization at the micro level
appears considerably less stable, with dramatic and sustained change ap-
pearing over a relatively short time period. The corollary is that testing for
the impact of fractionalization on instability, or growth, cannot necessarily
simply have recourse to aggregate measures in any dimension, since the real
change of relevance triggering the con‡ict might not be observable at the
aggregate level.
The second implication is potentially both more interesting, but also of
greater signi…cance for estimation purposes. We have already noted that
larger marginalized minorities in South Africa show a relatively rapid degree
of acceptance of the language of trade and industry: English. The preceding
evidence reports that the Coloured, Portuguese but particularly the Asian
communities of South Africa showsubstantive tendencies to adopt English as
their main language. Such changes may re‡ect decisions to improve employ-
ment andeconomicprospects by acquiring the linguisticcurrency ofeconomic
activity. In e¤ect, this encompasses a choice to invest in more appropriate
forms of both human and social capital in order to increase the prospects for
both individual occupational mobility and the reduction of the transactions
costs entailed in participation in the economy. 18The suggestion is that at
least larger, more signi…cant minorities face considerable incentives to assim-
ilate into dominant linguistic patterns. 19By contrast, small minorities (such
as the German and/or Frenchspeakers in the White population) may be able
to retain linguistic identity longer since they are insigni…cant enough to be
18In the case of Asians, additional factors would have included the policy decision in
1948 to terminate immigration from India, and to decrease to the point of elimination
funding for private Indian schools (see Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz, 2000). Both measures
prevented Indian linguistic usage from being sustained through investment in the stock of
primary language users.
19Economic incentives toward linguistic assimilation need not be restricted to minorities.
Su¢cient economic pay-o¤ may induce even majorities to change. A tempting means of
independent veri…cation lurks here. Currently the African population of South Africa has
unprecedented access to schooling resources. A predicted change which follows from the
interpretation of the data series presented above is that the African population too should
come to manifest reduced levels of linguistic fractionalization, since the prevailing language
of education, industry and commerce, and government in South Africa is English. This
latent change in linguistic fractionalization would be hidden in current and past census
data, since the primary language use of households is collected on heads of households.
Only once the current population of school children and university students forms its own
households, would the change become evident.Using Fractionalization Indexes: 16
left alone and develop their own cultural enclaves within the broader society.
The net consequence ofthis may be that linguistic fractionalizationat the
micro level manifests the lack of stability noted above. Importantly, we note
that the implication is that linguistic fractionalization is no longer an exoge-
nous (constant), but becomes endogenous to the potential of distributional
con‡ict. Those population groups most at risk from con‡ict (large minori-
ties) have an incentive to assimilate, while either larger groupings and/or
small minorities have the means to maintain their identity over time.
In turn, this carries apotential challenge for the notionthat fractionaliza-
tion necessarily leads to distributional con‡ict between linguistic groups. At
the very least one would have to recognize that in the South African context
minority groups had an incentive to integrate into the prevailing language of
commerce and industry, and did so with alacrity. Perhaps this is true only of
minorities, and in the presence of roughly equally sized groups (eg. Belgium)
the story might be di¤erent. Indeed the lengthy stand-o¤ between white
and African population groups in South Africa would suggest that where
“opponent” groups are of su¢cient size or in‡uence, distributional con‡ict
may indeed be protracted and intense. Nevertheless, the evidence points to
the importance and signi…cance of nuance and clinical study as a valuable
extension of aggregate or summary cross sectional evidence.
5 Accuracy and precision: just how key are these watch-
words?
A substantial sub-theme in the debate surrounding the impact of ethno-
linguisitic fractionalization on economic and social development has come
to focus on questions of accuracy in the measurement of fractionalization.
Indeed, section 2 of this paper itself added some additional re‡ections in
this regard. Such deliberations are valuable. But they do beg the question of
what practical signi…cance errors of measurement might be in empirical work
investigating the impact of fractionalization on economic growth, say. This
questionbecomeall the morepressingifit is indeedtruethatfractionalization
matters (in distributional con‡ict, say), andifthe measurement problems the
literature refers to are as widespread as this and other studies suggest.
We provide two initial sets of consideration from the South African case
study that lend themselves to shedding some light on the practical question
posed. From 1970 South Africa engaged in the creation of nominally inde-Using Fractionalization Indexes: 17
pendent “homelands” that subsequently were excluded from o¢cial popula-
tion census data for South Africa. Since the population of these homelands
were essentially de…ned on linguistic grounds,20 the corresponding linguis-
tic groups in the o¢cial South African censuses were correspondingly under
enumerated. In Table 4, we report the contrast between the uncorrected and
thecorrected census computations ofBlack andtotal South Africanlinguistic
fractionalization indexes for the 1980 and 1991 census observations (the only
ones a¤ected).21 In addition, we also report the o¢cial census populations,
the populations of the up to four homelands, and the proportion of the rel-
evant linguistic grouping excluded by virtue of the non-enumeration of the
homelands.
Note that the exclusion of the homeland populations from the o¢cial
South African census resulted in a substantial under enumeration. Up to
50% of a set of linguistic groups that together constituted approximately
40% of South Africa’s black population was thereby excluded from o¢cial
census data (hence approximately 20% of the total population).
Unsurprisingly therefore, a divergence betweenuncorrected andcorrected
fractionalizationindexes for the black population emerges. But given the size
of the underlying measurement error (20% of the total population excluded),
on the other hand the divergence is arguably surprisingly small: 0.78 on the
uncorrected fractionalization index versus 0.83 on the corrected index con-
stitutes the maximal divergence, for the black population in South Africa.
Moreover, for the aggregate total population fractionalization index, the di-
vergence between the corrected and the uncorrected index is negligible: 0.86
versus 0.85.
An immediate implication that follows is that while measurement error in
thecomputationoffractionalizationindexes is undoubtedly aserious concern,
and should of course be minimized, the fractionalization indexes used in the
literature might also be argued to be in fact fairly robust to measurement
error. Of course bias emerges in the fractionalization indexes - but it appears
that the error of measurement would have to be fairly substantial before
a signi…cant divergence between the true and the biased fractionalization
20Transkei and Ciskei were essentially Xhosa-, Bophutatswana Tswana-, and Venda
Venda-speaking.
21The Homelands were created after 1970, and were reincorporated into o¢cial censuses
after 1994. Thus only the 1980 and 1991 census years reported in this study were a¤ected.
Note: the remainder of the study reports only fractionalization indexes corrected for the
under enumeration.Using Fractionalization Indexes: 18
measure emerges.
There is a second sense in which the role of precision of measurement in
fractionalization indexes can be investigated on South African data.
In Table 5 we report a measure of political fractionalization.22 The index
is computed on parliamentary representation - and only for the White House
of Assembly, and reports the probability that two randomly chosen mem-
bers of parliament would represent di¤erent political parties.23 By its very
construction, therefore, the measure cannot be said to capture the “true”
political fractionalization that could properly be said to have prevailed in
South Africa. But equally, the fractionalization measure nevertheless cannot
be said to be devoid of informational content.
The correlation between our measure of political fractionalization and a
range of measures of political rights, civil liberties, political instability and
property rights is reported in Table 6. While for some measures of rights
(Freedom House Political Rights), and political instability there is little cor-
relation with the political fractionalization measure, for others the correla-
tion proves more substantial (the Fedderke et al 2001a political freedoms and
property rights measures, and the Freedom House Civil Liberties measure).
How might we interpret these correlations? We have just notedthat these
are imprecise measures, su¤ering from (potentially unknown) measurement
error. For normally distributed data the observed correlation between two
variables is equal to the “true” correlation between such variables if perfectly
measured times the square root of the product of the reliability coe¢cients
for each variable.24 For many social data, reliability is not above 0.8 to 0.9.
So observed correlation coe¢cients of 0.6 to 0.8 are high, given the unreli-
ability of measurement. To illustrate, suppose that the rights variables of
Table 6 are each measured with reliability of 0.8, while the parliamentary
22The measure was …rst introduced in Fedderke et al (2001a).
23From 1910-1983 South Africa had only the House of Assembly as its formal legislative
chamber. It essentially represented Whites, though even prior to 1983 representation of
Africans, Coloureds and Asians existed under the Representation of Natives Act (1936),
and the Separate Representation of Voters Act (1955). Such representation was more
notional than real. From 1983 South Africa introduced a three chamber parliament, with
a White House of Assembly, the Asian House of Delegates, and the Coloured House of
Representatives. Africans had no representation (outside of the notionally independent
ethnically de…ned homelands), until 1994 and the introduction of the …rst democratic
South African parliament.
24A reliability coe¢cient of 1.0 would indicate perfect agreement and no measurement
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fractionalization measure is measured with no error at all (we can observe
parliamentary composition without error). The implied “true” correlations
are reported in the …nal row of Table 6. What emerges is that the parliamen-
tary fractionalization measure, despite its clearly partial and unsatisfactory
provenance, nevertheless holds substantial information concerning a range of
other institutional dimensions. Putting it another way: we would be hard-
pressed to say that these correlated variables are measuring very di¤erent
things.
We draw two …nal implications from these explorations. First, partial
measures, and even poorly measured variables still hold information. Sec-
ond, the existence of dense webs of association between variables noted else-
where,25 suggests that a wide range of social indicators, even if at …rst sight
relatively partial and incomplete, nevertheless may carry useful modeling
opportunity, if employed with appropriate discretion.
We hasten to add that we do not mean to say that measurement error
is a trivial concern. Much of the discussion in the preceding sections of this
paper have pointed to the importance of measuring the right dimensions, at
the right levels of aggregation, and accurately. But equally, measurement
error is also just measurement error - it need not be the end of the analytical
world.
6 Conclusion: implications for growth studies
The tenure of the discussion has been focused on the development of general
methodological lessons associated with a speci…c time series case study. It
remains to draw the general conclusions to emerge.
First, we note immediately that while many oftheaggregate fractionaliza-
tion indexes show considerable stationarity over time, this is not universally
true (Racial Fractionalization), and even where it does hold, the aggregate
stability hides substantial movement at the micro level. The implication we
draw is that indicators of social cleavage may themselves be subject to sub-
stantial change over time, rendering the question of what drives such changes
(particularly whether economic development indicators do so) germane.26
Second, the evidence presented above is suggestive of a more substan-
25See the extensive investigation in Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998).
26This is a question we explore in greater detail in a separate paper (Fedderke et al,
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tive hypothesis. We have observed that linguistic fractionalization in South
Africa is subject to an (admittedly slight) downward trend, while religious
fractionalization has been increasing. (The contrast is suitably dramatic for
Asians). One possible interpretation of the evidence is that the movement
in the two indexes is due not so much to changes in underlying cleavages in
South African society, but to changes in the nature of identity formation. In
particular, the evidence is consistent with a shift of identity formation that
is based on “essentialist” linguistic (ethnic) roots, to one which is choice-
based. Increased religious fractionalization might re‡ect the abandonment of
religions of birth, in favour of religions of choice.
Third, we note the signi…cant di¢culties associated with data collection
surrounding social cleavage. We note further that in cross sectional contexts
this issue surely compounds. Consistency, as well as reliability of data com-
pilation must play a role across wide geographical reaches, and periods of
time. Countries with the highest levels of fractionalization are those most
likely to have the most contentious data being employed in cross sectional
studies.
But we also note that measurement di¢culties surrounding fractionaliza-
tion indexes are also not necessarily terminal. On the South African time
series data we show that even relatively egregious problems of measurement
do not necessarily bias fractionalization measures as much as one might have
anticipated. Certainly the means of exploring the relationship between dif-
ferent measures of social and institutional context remains alive, even in the
presence of measurement error.
Finally, the evidence on various fractionalization indexes reported above
presents the suggestion that various social cleavages (for instance religious
and linguistic fractionalization) show a strong correspondence. Where the
society is fractionalized in one, it is tempting to conclude that it will be frac-
tionalized in other dimensions also. Racial fractionalization may be mirrored
in linguistic as well as religious diversity.
A further question that then arises in this regard relates to the impor-
tance of the intentional mobilization of social cleavage which may itself be
inherently latent, often through political agency.27 How and when such mo-
bilization may come to be successful may depend substantially on the in-
stitutional context. For instance, South Africa’s historical institutional em-
27See for instance the discussion in Hamilton and Wright (1993) on the South African
context.Using Fractionalization Indexes: 21
phasis on racial cleavage as a means of economic and political exclusion had
the e¤ect of exacerbating distributional con‡ict, here con…rmed by bounds
analysis, thus harming growth. By contrast, religious fractionalization may
have had very little or no impact at all on economic activity.
Which particular line of social cleavage, when, how and why deserves
close attention. With the suggestion that any one particular form of social
cleavage may not be signi…cant - what matters is the existence of cleavage,
and the institutional means of exploiting such cleavage.
Given the conclusions that have been reached in terms of the potential
impact of fractionalization on long run growth, it is essential that we ensure
that we are using the right measures. This paper does not purport to have
developed the “right” measures but it has raised important caveats about
the way in which cross-sectional growth studies employ the fractionalization
indexes currently available.28 It also suggests that the use of time series data
for individual country case studies may be a fruitful new route for social
scientists interested in the development prospects of developing countries.
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national Economics, 51(2): 437-461.Table 1: Fractionalization Measures for available South African census 
years 
 
 Fractionalization  Measure 
Census 
Year 
Linguistic   Religious   Racial  
1911     0.49 
1921     0.49 
1936   0.82  0.48 
1945 0.86  0.84 0.48 
1951 0.87  0.86 0.49 
1960 0.87  0.88 0.49 
1970 0.86  0.89 0.46 
1980 0.86  0.88 0.44 
1991 0.86  0.87 0.39 
1996     0.38 




Table 2: PSS F-tests for direction of association. 
Row headings denote forcing variables. Column headings outcome variables. * denotes 
unambiguous significance of the test statistic, allowing the rejection of the null of no 
association. ** denotes an indeterminate test statistic 
 









Fractionalization  - 18.58*  3.95  5.73** 
Linguistic 
Fractionalization  4.97 -  5.53**  8.54* 
Political Instability  3.36  13.62*  -  0.59 
Racial 





Table 3: Fractionalization measures for available South African census 
years – the racial breakdown 
 
 
Linguistic Fractionalization  Religious Fractionalization  Census 
Year  White Coloured Asian African Total White Coloured Asian African Total
1945 0.52  0.19  0.80 0.81 0.86  0.75 0.83 0.48  0.74  0.84 
1951 0.52  0.20  0.80 0.81 0.87  0.78 0.85 0.47  0.78  0.86 
1960 0.52  0.20  0.80 0.82 0.87  0.77 0.84 0.47  0.83  0.88 
1970 0.54  0.21  0.78 0.80 0.86  0.79 0.84 0.47  0.85  0.89 
1980 0.58  0.29  0.46 0.83 0.86  0.79 0.85 0.51  0.82  0.88 




Table 4: Assessing Fractionalization Index Sensitivity to Error of Measurement 
 





 Total Population 
Frac  
Index 
Count Count  Proportion  of 
 Total SA Population 
Proportion of Linguistic 












1970 3912680 1679920 359480  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.28  0.12  0.03  0.80    0.86   
1980 2791981 1346383 160135 2323650 1323315 315545 0.45  0.50 0.66  0.23 0.12 0.02  0.79  0.83  0.86  0.86 



























  Year Index Year Index 
1910 0.59  1958 0.50 
1915 0.69  1961 0.48 
1920 0.74  1966 0.40 
1921 0.54  1970 0.43 
1924 0.61  1974 0.43 
1929 0.58  1977 0.33 
1933 0.59  1981 0.33 
1938 0.44  1987 0.47 
1943 0.58  1989 0.57 
1948 0.61  1994 0.55 







































et al 2001a) 
Political 
Fractionalization 
0.77 -0.02 0.69 -0.03 0.48 
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